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POINTS FOR DISCUSSION WITH VICE PRESIDENT JOHNSON

Berlin Military Build-up

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Mandatory Review

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The situation is as follows:

General Norstad has sent a paper to the NATO Secretary General Giving his ideas as to the specific items of build-up each member of the Alliance should be asked to undertake to complement the measures the US is taking. Reports of all of the member countries are now in and are being analyzed by General Norstad, by the International Secretariat of NATO and by this Mission.

General Norstad reports that the responses as to the allimportant Central Region show a significant increase. On the ground, it appears from General Norstad's evaluation of the Alliance's response that Allied strength will be increased in the Center by something of the order of 30% by the end of this year; and additional air strength is also forthcoming. Germany is doing all it can short of mobilization; France is doing all that could be expected in light of the Algerian situation, and the Dutch as usual are taking important steps. Canada is reinforcing its contingent in Europe; in the South, Italy, Greece and Turkey are taking gratifying steps, the latter two countries being limited by their financial situation. Norway, Denmark and Belgium, while taking some steps, are laggard by comparison. The UK is putting a bold face on a weak effort, and this will be the case as long as they will not consider a draft. Details, country by country, are available in a separate Top Secret paper.

However: preliminary studies in this Mission show, even after some build-up now underway or planned a seriously unsatisfactory condition for the Alliance's conventional air

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strength. No blame is attachable to anyone for this condition of affairs; for it is the result of the Alliance policy (concurred in by the US) which obtained before the review of NATO policy made by the present US Administration last spring—namely that a nuclear response would be made early against any USSR attack on NATO territory and that accordingly the air power of the Alliance should be concentrated on nuclear power with little planning for purely conventional air power.

There are further measures that can and should be taken. Washington has some ideas, the International Staff of NATO is studying the matter, and so is this Mission. We in this Mission are following up on all three with the plan of seeing what further response can be asked of the Alliance.



Attitude of the Alliance on the Four Power Handling of the

Berlin Crisis

One of Mr. Khrushchev's purposes in the crisis about
Berlin which he has created is to crack and if possible
break the North Atlantic Alliance. He has not succeeded, and
he will not succeed. But there is no doubt about it, Mr.
Khrushchev's tactics put a considerable strain on the Alliance.

The problem is this: On the one hand the three occupying powers (Britain, France and the US) have an immediate responsibility for Berlin; West Germany also has a special interest; and accordingly these Four powers have the day by day policy-making job. This they have carried on mainly in Washington through a Four-Power Ambassadorial group, with occasional meetings of the Four-Power Foreign Ministers.

There was thus the danger that the other 11 members of the Alliance would be left out in the cold, and this would have been bad. Many of them have their own ideas as to what should be done about Berlin, and all are agreed that what the Four decided in Washington may very well involve the other 11 in war. So they wanted and want very definitely to be consulted.



Thanks to excellent backstopping in Washington from the State Department, starting with the Secretary and going on down, the Four kept the other 11 pretty well informed and, to some extent, brought them in on the decisions. We here in the North Atlantic Council have helped this by evolving some new methods of consultation which have proven most satisfactory. The result is that I think I can say that this this situation, has been so potentially dangerous to the Alliance, has been satisfactorily worked out and that there is a considerable unanimity in the Alliance on the substance of Western policy toward Berlin and an increasing satisfaction by the 11 as to the way they have been consulted by the Four. There are still rumblings.

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
I will talk to the Vice President in some detail this morning I hope, but on the whole things are not too bad.

On the substantive side there is agreement among all 15 on the basic rights of the West in Berlin with which we are all familiar: 1) the right of self-determination of the people of West Berlin; 2) the right of free access from the West to West Berlin; 3) the maintenance of Allied troops in West Berlin; 4) the continuation of the occupation status until it is changed by agreement with the Thra Western occupying powers.

There are, however, some differences on the substance still remaining. Until the President's speech, I think there was a strong feeling among the 11 that the West should come forward with some proposals of its own and not let Mr. Khrushchev make all the proposals. The President's speech to the UN went very far to eliminate this feeling among the ll. I think there is a very substantial agreement among the 11 with what the President said in his UN speech, namely, that Mr. Khrushchev started this crisis, he wants to make some changes, let him make the proposals as to what changes he wants; then if they are at all reasonable, we will talk about them; but in the meantime we are not going to put forward any ideas of our own; this is not to say that we don't realize that the occupation status is something which ought not to go on indefinitely, but we don't think the present atmosphere is one in which we care to make any proposals to the Russians to change it. This, as we see it here, is pretty much what the President said in his speech.

There is, though, some disagreement still with this line. Some of the Alliance (Canada and Norway in the lead) are taking the line that time is on the side of the Russians and that we ought to try to get in Western proposals for the future status of West Berlin before Mr. Khrushchev signs his treaty with the East Germans. I take it that our US point of view is not to be driven

by any sense of urgency into a trading position we don't like and are accordingly working (I think with some success) on the Canadians and Norwegians and anyone else who brings up this idea. In short, my report on this particular phase of our Berlin problem is optimistic. The Alliance is still in good shape, despite this extremely difficult problem of bringing the ll into the deliberations of the Four.



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